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Regulatory Reform and 
International Trade Policy 
Roger G. No11 
An unusual feature of the contemporary debate about trade policy is its 
focus on regulation. In the United States, regulatory policy has been politi- 
cally controversial since its inception, but until the late 1970s the debate 
focused on either the legitimacy of government control over various as- 
pects of private production and transactions or whether specific areas of 
regulation generated positive social benefits. In Europe and Japan, the 
parallel policy debate during most  of the twentieth  century was  about 
the boundary between public and private enterprise. In most of the world, 
the most common political response to a perceived performance shortfall 
in an important industry was to nationalize it rather than to regulate it. 
In the 198Os, the terms of this debate shifted to more pragmatic issues. 
One issue area focused on rather technocratic matters: how to develop 
effective policies to promote competition where possible, and how to elim- 
inate the perverse incentives of  government control where competition 
was not possible. The other issue area was the relationship between do- 
mestic regulation and the commitment to open economies. 
As the advanced industrialized nations eased into the current regime of 
relatively free trade, the regulatory policy debate was internationalized in 
three important ways. First, opponents of regulation-especially  compa- 
nies opposed to environmental,  health,  and  safety regulation-argued 
that regulatory policy eroded the “competitiveness” of industry and con- 
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tributed to persistent trade deficits. Second, firms that were adversely af- 
fected by  regulation and regulators themselves began to seek new ideas 
about how to reduce the financial and bureaucratic burdens of regulatory 
policy, a search that often led them to examine how these policies were car- 
ried out in other countries. Third, as direct trade barriers fell, and in many 
cases became negligible, countries began to incorporate regulatory policy 
into trade negotiations as a means of reducing indirect trade barriers. 
In recent years, the regulatory reform debate has spilled over into many 
transitional and developing countries. Literally hundreds of state-owned 
enterprises have been privatized since the late 1980s, and in many cases 
privatization either was conducted in a manner that left the formally na- 
tionalized industry reasonably competitive or, at minimum, has opened 
the door to the possibility of competitive entry against incumbent monop- 
olists. 
This essay provides an overview of the international ramifications of the 
regulatory reform debate and the experiences of several countries with reg- 
ulatory reform proposals. The essay also examines how international trade 
negotiations can play an important role in regulatory reform. 
1.1  The Evolution of Regulatory Reform 
In most  advanced industrialized  democracies, regulatory  reform has 
been a salient political  issue for two decades or more. The concept  of 
regulatory reform is broad and somewhat vague and on occasion has been 
claimed by ideological proponents of either harsh or lax changes that, in 
reality, would be wildly inefficient. Notwithstanding these proposals, the 
core idea of regulatory reform-at  least among scholars of business pol- 
icy-is  to improve the efficiency of policies that  intervene in decisions 
about market entry, production methods, product attributes, and transac- 
tions between suppliers and customers. Reform can mean deregulation, 
privatization  combined  with  the creation  of  a regulatory  authority,  or 
more targeted  and focused regulatory reform that makes greater use of 
economic incentives, economic policy analysis, and policy coordination 
among agencies. 
The debate about regulatory reform is neither empty nor sterile. Most 
nations have significantly changed some major regulatory policies and are 
considering further changes. Regulatory reform is politically salient for 
two main reasons. First, regulatory policies impose significant costs, and 
reform can reduce these costs without sacrificing regulatory objectives. 
Probably most of the regulatory reforms in the United States and other 
advanced industrialized countries that took place before 1990 were moti- 
vated primarily by  the objective of improving the domestic economy by 
increasing the efficiency of regulated industries. Second, as direct trade 
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come an increasingly important  source of  distortions  in  international 
trade and a more frequent cause of trade conflicts. As a result, in the 1990s 
regulatory reform increasingly was instigated as part of a broader package 
of  reforms that were  motivated by  international economic policies. For 
example, domestic entry prohibitions in classic infrastructural industries, 
such as transportation, electricity, and telecommunications, as well as do- 
mestic design requirements to protect consumer health and safety, came 
into conflict with  trade  agreements that promised  openness to foreign 
trade and investment and “national treatment” of foreign firms. Conse- 
quently, a nation’s seemingly domestic regulatory policies became the sub- 
ject of international controversy. 
As a result of the growing importance of the international ramifications 
of  domestic regulation, with rising frequency regulatory policy has be- 
come an issue in international negotiations about trade and investment 
policies. International agreements have initiated multilateral coordination 
of regulatory reform. For example, the vast majority of members of  the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) have signed the voluntary agreement 
to liberalize telecommunications policy, and most agreed to begin imple- 
mentation before the year 2000. The European Union has adopted several 
reforms, some incorporated into the Treaty of Rome, to harmonize envi- 
ronmental, health, and safety regulations and has implemented plans to 
liberalize airline and telecommunications regulation. Major trade liberal- 
ization agreements typically establish dispute resolution institutions to ad- 
judicate claims that a trading partner is attempting to gain an unfair trade 
advantage by  using regulation as an indirect trade barrier or by applying 
lax regulation to businesses that produce exported products. Examples are 
the role of the European Court of Justice in adjudicating trade disputes 
arising from regulation among EU countries and of the WTO in resolving 
similar disputes among signatories to the GATT and successor agreements. 
The elevation of regulatory policy to an issue of international economic 
policy is controversial. Some charge that internationalizing regulatory re- 
form is an attempt by  zealots to impose stringent regulation on nations 
that neither need nor want it, and to turn advocates of regulatory policies 
into opponents of free trade. Others contend that emphasizing the trade 
consequences of regulation amounts to advocacy of a regulatory “race to 
the bottom,” whereby the nations that have done the most to pursue so- 
cially desirable regulatory policies are being forced to abandon them be- 
cause regulations affect trade. 
The primary objective of this essay is to examine the relationship be- 
tween regulatory reform and international economic integration. This es- 
say has two  main messages. First, internationalization of  regulatory re- 
form is inevitable, and not just because the social and economic problems 
that give rise to regulation cross borders, as is emphasized by advocates of 
international environmental regulation (see, e.g., Shabecoff 1996). Even 16  Roger G. No11 
without these cross-border problems, regulation inevitably is an interna- 
tional issue because, when other forms of trade barriers are low, regula- 
tions can be the main source of trade distortion. Second, internationaliz- 
ing regulatory reform  is  not likely  to produce either disaster scenario: 
widespread overregulation or massive underregulation. Instead, interna- 
tionalization of regulatory reform is a healthy development that is likely 
to improve the efficiency  of  regulation while removing trade distortions 
that arise from inefficient regulation. 
1.2  Regulatory Policy and Market Access 
The guiding principle of free trade is that national boundaries should 
play no role in defining the potential market for any product. Distance or 
differences in tastes between countries might cause a firm in one country 
to regard sales in another country as infeasible, but not because crossing 
the border creates substantial impediments to the transaction. One impor- 
tant feature of technological progress is that it has substantially reduced 
the economic costs of international transactions. An especially good ex- 
ample is the effect of the Internet on the ease of consumer purchases.’ This 
example is especially relevant for thinking about the future of  interna- 
tional cooperation in regulation because the extraordinarily rapid growth 
of electronic communications could massively restructure transactions ar- 
rangements. 
The creation of the Internet has rapidly led to a circumstance in which 
anyone who owns a personal computer with a modem that connects to 
the telephone network can access millions of web sites all over the world 
that sell almost all consumer and office products. In many cases prices on 
web sites are substantially lower than ordinary retail prices, even if ship- 
ping charges are added, because web  suppliers can avoid most distribu- 
tion costs and can more easily engage in “just in time,” “make to order,” 
and other practices that reduce inventory costs. Especially in the United 
States, Internet  transactions  are growing very  rapidly  and  conceivably 
could lead to a substantial reduction in retail stores within a few years. 
For Internet retailing to work efficiently requires an array of domestic 
regulatory policies that do not create barriers to electronic commerce. In- 
ternet shopping requires that the user remain connected to a web site for 
a substantial period of time over the telecommunications network. In na- 
tions where connections are unreliable and frequently interrupted by poor 
service, Internet shopping is very difficult if not impossible. But even if the 
network has high quality, regulators can make Internet shopping unattrac- 
1. For a more detailed discussion of  trade barriers arising in Internet transactions, see 
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tive simply by  imposing excessive usage charges for telephone service or 
high prices on operators of web sites.* 
Likewise, Internet shopping requires that the transportation system not 
be so expensive that it makes transactions financially unattractive if  the 
buyer and seller are physically separated. If transportation is regulated in 
a way that imposes very high prices on small-package service or discour- 
ages fast, reliable service (such as by  prohibiting such service in order to 
protect parcel post), most Internet shopping becomes infeasible. 
In similar fashion, efficient Internet transactions typically involve the 
use of the banking system, as customers use credit accounts or electronic 
funds transfer to pay for their goods. Hence, a necessary component of 
Internet transactions is a supportive system of regulation of commercial 
transactions. And, of course, the system of taxing transactions cannot im- 
pose substantially more costs on electronic transactions than on transac- 
tions through retail stores. 
Finally, environmental, health, and safety regulations determine whether 
a buyer legally can acquire a product. Even if the product complies with 
all regulations at the points of manufacture and use, a system that requires 
elaborate testing and documentation by the buyer if the good arrives in a 
shipment, as contrasted to being purchased at a retail shop, also can im- 
pose a formidable barrier to Internet transactions. 
The significance of  these examples is  that each is  far more likely  to 
present a serious problem if  a transaction is arranged across a national 
boundary. 
Usage charges for international calling are often extremely high com- 
pared to both domestic rates and the cost of service. Indeed, many coun- 
tries set very high prices for origination and termination of international 
calls for the purpose of generating what amounts to a large tax on foreign- 
ers to subsidize domestic telephone service or in some cases to generate 
general government revenues. In similar fashion, international  shipping 
rates are often several times the price for domestic shipping over compara- 
ble distances, and many countries have prohibited entry by  fast package 
delivery services. For example, a seven-pound parcel can be shipped by 
two-day delivery for $15 from New York to Los Angeles, $66 from New 
York to Paris, $94 from Paris to New York, or $61 over the much shorter 
distance from Paris to Frankfurt (all prices in U.S. dollars; OECD 1995c, 
12). Likewise, in some nations financial regulations, import restrictions, 
tariffs and the mechanism for collecting them, and currency controls im- 
pose direct costs as well as significant bureaucratic burdens on buyers who 
wish to make international purchases. 
2. OECD (1996b, 32). Internet access prices tend to be much lower in countries that permit 
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Finally, environmental, health, and safety regulation sometimes treats 
imported goods differently than domestic ones. Even when both sending 
and receiving countries have equivalent standards, they may not have a 
mutual recognition agreement, so that the same product may have to pass 
exactly the same test separately in every country in which it is sold (OECD 
1996a). Or the product may be subject to disposal regulations that require 
involvement of the manufacturer or seller, so that foreign products are  effec- 
tively banned, even though other disposal arrangements are easy to ar- 
range. Environmental, health, and safety standards are a common, contin- 
uing source of trade barriers that lead to conflicts among trading partners. 
The Internet shopping problem focuses on transactions in which con- 
sumers deal directly with sellers in other countries, but the revolution in 
electronic communications is hardly limited to this case. International spe- 
cialization in production frequently causes each stage in a vertical produc- 
tion chain to be carried out in a different nation. Inexpensive, high-quality 
communications enables greater coordination and lower transactions costs 
at each interface in the vertical production chain. To the extent that regu- 
latory rules interfere with these transactions, they create a potential distor- 
tion in international trade. Moreover, the importance of regulatory distor- 
tions grows as real international transactions costs decline. 
Many fascinating historical disputes illustrate how, in particular, envi- 
ronmental, health, and safety regulation has been used to create trade 
barriers. Cassis de Dijon and German Bottles in the European Economic 
Communities (EEC) involved domestic regulations, the first about manda- 
tory alcoholic content for liqueurs and the second about bottle recycling, 
that had the effect of discriminating against imports. Canadian Red Rasp- 
berries refers to a dispute under the old Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree- 
ment, now incorporated into the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
in which Canadian raspberries could not be imported in the United States 
because, according to U.S. food regulation, they were not red enough. 
CAFE Standards involved a U.S. regulation that discriminated against for- 
eign automobile manufacturers in  implementing fuel efficiency regula- 
tions. Venezuelan Gasoline, the first case decided by the WTO, dealt with 
a U.S.  statute on clean-burning gasoline that required greater improve- 
ments in imported gasoline than were demanded of domestic refiners3  The 
cases involving automobile fuel efficiency and reformulated gasoline are 
especially instructive because in both of these cases the U.S. government 
quite explicitly tried to rig regulatory rules to protect domestic producers 
from foreign competition (Vogel 1997). 
An important feature of regulatory  trade distortions is that bilateral 
and regional trade agreements can increase, rather than reduce, these trade 
distortions. The textbook  explanation  of  how  bilateral  agreements can 
3. In each of these cases, the regulation was found to be an unfair indirect trade barrier. Regulatory Reform and International Trade Policy  19 
Table 1.1  Unit Production Costs and Trade Outcomes under Alternative 
Regulatory and Trade Regimes 
Country 
Cost Element  A  B  C 
1. Direct production 
2. Efficient 
3. Unit production 
compliance 
4. Efficient 




7.  Actual unit 
production 
8. Actual externality 
9. Actual unit social 
cost 
10. Tariff = 25 
1 1. Competitive price 
elsewhere 
12. B-C customs 
union with 
tariff = 10 
elsewhere 


























































Note: Entries are explained in the text. 
’Tariffs against A and C, respectively. 
bTariffs  against A and B, respectively. 
cPrice plus tariff of B’s output in A and C, respectively. 
dPrice plus tariff of C’s output in A and B, respectively. 
lower economic welfare is easily extended to the case of regulatory distor- 
tions. Table 1.1 constructs an example of three countries, A, B, and C,  and 
the actual and efficient private and social costs of a product that causes an 
external cost through polluting emissions in its production. The example 
assumes that transportation costs are zero, and that the importance of 
this product in the economies of the three countries is low enough that 
conditions in this industry have no significant effect on overall trade bal- 
ances and exchange rates. At equilibrium exchange rates, the example as- 
sumes that the countries have the same direct unit production costs for a 
particular good, shown on line  1; however, the countries have different 
external costs of production and different optimal and actual regulatory 20  Roger G. No11 
regimes. Note that in the example if no country regulates production, there 
will be no trade because direct private production costs will be the same 
everywhere. 
An efficient regulatory regime would pick  a regulatory  rule, R, that 
would maximize social welfare: 
mfx  B(x)  - C(x,R)  - E(x,R), 
where x is the rate of output and consumption, R is the set of regulatory 
rules, B (.) is the benefit of x to consumers and producers, C (.;)  is produc- 
tion cost if in compliance with regulation, and E (.;)  is the external harm 
created by production and consumption. Line 2 in table 1.1 is the incre- 
mental cost of production  arising from compliance with the regulatory 
rule that solves the maximization problem. Line 3 is the total unit private 
cost of production under this rule, which is also the competitive equilib- 
rium price if each country adopts an emission standard that is optimal in 
the sense that it equates marginal abatement cost  to marginal damage 
from pollution. As shown on line 3, if every country regulates optimally, 
country A will be the low-cost producer and so will produce for all three 
countries. 
The example assumes that the social cost of the externality is different 
in each country. Line 4  shows the unit external cost in each country if that 
country produces according to its optimal regulatory rule. This cost varies 
among the countries, perhaps due to differences in the countries’ natural 
environments or perhaps because their citizens place different values on 
aesthetic aspects of emissions. Line 5 is the total social cost, C + E, in 
each country, including the external cost. If producers must bear the exter- 
nal cost, such as would be the case if polluters were charged an emission 
tax, line 5 would be the competitive market price for the product in each 
country. Because of the particular assumptions in the table, the interna- 
tional specialization that would occur at these market prices is that coun- 
try B becomes the producer for all three nations, which is not the same as 
on line 3. If regulatory compliance is unusually expensive in one country, 
the optimal regulatory regime could produce relatively small compliance 
expenditure and relatively large external cost, in which case, as shown, the 
low-cost producer on line 3 can be a high-cost producer on line 5. Like- 
wise, all countries may face roughly the same compliance cost, but one 
country may attribute a very low cost to the externality, so that it has a 
low social cost (although not necessarily a low production cost). 
Of course, optimality in the international allocation of production re- 
quires that line 5 be the basis for international specialization. This reality 
causes what might be called the “Lawrence Summers pr~blem.”~  Despite 
4.  While at the World Bank, Lawrence Summers took considerable political flack for mak- 
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its controversial politics, optimal international specialization would allo- 
cate production of  goods that creates a local external cost to countries 
that place a low value on that cost. In this case, producers in country A 
have the lowest production cost; however, because country B places a low 
value on the remaining external cost, it has the lowest social cost and so 
is the most efficient producer. Of course, these results could be  reversed 
with a small change in external cost in these countries. 
Lines 6 and 8 depict an actual regulatory regime, as opposed to the 
theoretical ideal, showing the actual cost of compliance and external ef- 
fects. Lines 7 and 9 show the international specialization that would occur 
at market prices that reflect only production  cost and total social cost, 
respectively. Notice that, in this example, if external cost is not taken into 
account, country C produces the commodity, even though it has the high- 
est social cost of  production.  If  social cost is taken into account, then 
country A is the lowest cost producer. 
The significance of these examples, of course, is that they demonstrate 
the dependence of the allocation of trade on regulatory policy in a world 
of putatively free trade. Lines 3, 5, 7, and 9 illustrate four possible regula- 
tory regimes that  determine the international  allocation of  production 
among the three countries. Producers in country C can survive only in the 
case depicted on lines 6 and 7: very lax domestic regulation that does not 
hold the industry responsible for its external cost. Implicit in the example 
is the assumption that from the perspective of producers in country C, 
demand is highly elastic, so that the imposition of a significant regulatory 
cost (in this case, social-welfare-maximizing regulation) would cause the 
domestic industry to shut down. 
Finally, lines 10 through 13 show the effects of tariffs. Lines 10 and 11 
show the effect  of a unit tariff of 25. If each country imposes a tariff of 
25, no country engages in trade because its domestic production cost on 
line 7 is lower than the import price from other countries on line 11. The 
same outcome would prevail if market prices in every country reflect total 
social cost, for the comparison would be between line 9 and the amount 
on line 11 plus the external cost in that country. Note that producers in 
countries A and B, not to mention environmental advocates, can be ex- 
pected to express a great deal of quite justified indignation about a pro- 
posal to move from the high-tariff regime on line 11 to the free trade re- 
gime  on line 7, for  this movement would  reallocate all production  to 
country C, which  has the highest social cost due solely to its failure to 
regulate effectively. 
Line 13 depicts the outcome if countries B and C form a customs union 
least damage, which often is in a developing country that places a higher value on economic 
development and income growth than on environmental quality. The point made by  Sum- 
mers and the political response to it provide extremely useful insights into why  regulatory 
policy has become an important component of international trade negotiations. 22  Roger G. Noll 
in which they each impose a tariff of 10 on each other but maintain a tariff 
of 25 against country A, which A reciprocates. In this regime, country C 
exports to country B (inefficiently), and country A produces for itself (also 
inefficiently). 
One can produce many other permutations of these results by assuming 
different regulatory regimes in different countries with respect to either 
the efficiency of their regulation or the extent to which external costs are 
internalized in market prices. As is apparent from the example, different 
combinations of regimes produce differences in the extent of international 
specialization. For example, suppose that country B regulates efficiently, 
with external cost fully internalized in the market price, but country C 
regulates inefficiently-and  does not pursue a policy that causes external 
cost to affect price. In this case, the market price in B will be 120, while 
the market price in C will be 104. During negotiations over dropping the 
tariff from 25 to 10, country B will  recognize that by  doing so it is  in 
danger of losing an efficient industry to country C and so may want to 
discuss regulatory reform in C as part of the trade negotiations. 
The purpose of these examples is to demonstrate two  crucial points. 
First, regulatory policy can have an effect on international trade that arises 
for either “good” (efficiency) or “bad” (regulatory inefficiency) reasons. 
Second, for either reason regulatory policy can emerge as a crucial part of 
trade negotiations. The differences in regulatory costs among nations arise 
from three sources: differences in compliance costs arising from a locally 
optimal policy, differences in total social costs and the extent to which 
external costs are reflected in market prices, and differences in the extent 
to which countries pursue the optimal regulatory policy. For trade negotia- 
tions to produce an improvement in the international allocation of re- 
sources, the causes of regulation-induced international specialization must 
be recognized and taken into account in the trade agreement. 
1.3  Rationalizing Regulatory Objectives and Methods 
The preceding discussion is based on the premise that some of the ob- 
served variation in the cost of regulation reflects inefficiency rather than 
valid policy objectives. All regulation carries the danger that it will reduce 
efficiency by increasing production costs without delivering offsetting so- 
cial benefits; however, lax regulation can produce inefficiency by encourag- 
ing production that has low private but high social cost. In addition, all 
forms of regulation may further reduce economic efficiency by  thwarting 
international competition, and especially the entry of firms into markets 
that are not competitive or that are served by inefficient incumbents. 
A great deal of research on regulatory policy argues that in several im- 
portant areas, regulation does impose unnecessary costs. If a regulation 
imposes costs but serves no valid social purpose, or more generally if regu- Regulatory Reform and International Trade Policy  23 
latory methods serve a valid purpose but are grossly inefficient, the conse- 
quence is an inefficient domestic economy. If a poorly performing indus- 
try’s inefficiency is the result of government policies, the industry is likely 
to receive a sympathetic political response when it seeks protection against 
foreign competitors that face more efficient regulation and hence lower 
regulatory compliance costs. Consequently, domestic regulatory  reform 
can complement liberalized trade and foreign investment policies. 
Notwithstanding the presence of some unnecessary regulatory costs, in- 
ternational differences in the cost of regulation may reflect valid differ- 
ences in circumstances among countries. For example, a given amount of 
emissions will cause different amounts of damaging pollution because of 
physical, ecological, and climatic differences among locations. Similarly, 
local differences in relative factor prices (including the shadow prices of 
environmental resources) can cause the cost of achieving a given amount 
of abatement to differ across locations. Likewise, the aesthetic benefits of 
pollution abatement are likely to exhibit a positive income elasticity of 
demand and so to be valued more highly in a wealthy nation than in a poor 
one. All three factors are a legitimate source of comparative advantage in 
international trade. In short, Lawrence Summers was right! 
A regulation-induced  trade effect is frequently mischaracterized as a 
“competitiveness” issue that involves the overall trade performance of a 
nation, as measured by  the balance of trade or domestic unemployment 
in export industries. Industries that produce traded goods and that experi- 
ence significant regulatory compliance costs correctly perceive that regula- 
tion has reduced their ability to compete with firms that are located in 
countries with lower costs of compliance. Regardless of whether a nation’s 
high regulatory compliance costs reflect efficient or inefficient regulatory 
decisions, an industry that faces especially stringent regulations is likely to 
complain about the absence of a level playing field. In some cases, political 
leaders who are sympathetic to the industry may call for regulatory relief 
to improve the industry’s competitive position. In other cases, the call may 
be for trade barriers against nations that have less stringent regulation. 
The latter position can be the basis for a coalition of trade-impacted regu- 
lated industries and environmentalists in which the latter are motivated by 
the desire to influence pollution in other countries. 
As the preceding examples of the trade effects of regulation indicate, 
the economics of regulation-induced trade distortion is more subtle and 
complex than the competitiveness argument implies. Indeed,  a nation’s 
movement to more stringent regulation can be an act to level the playing 
field in the sense of eliminating indirect subsidies that take the form of un- 
priced overuse of environmental resources in production. 
Even in the absence of trade, stringent regulation causes regulated prod- 
ucts to be more expensive and thereby shifts the composition of domestic 
economic activity into other, less regulated activities. If  all regulations, 24  Roger G. No11 
both stringent  and lax, reflect efficient responses to real problems, this 
shift in the composition of production is desirable: on balance, it improves 
the economic welfare of a nation. But if some regulations are too stringent, 
or others are too lax, the pattern of regulation is harmful to national eco- 
nomic welfare. Under a liberal trade regime, the shift in  the industrial 
composition of domestic output is even larger because exports displace 
domestic production for intensely regulated products, while domestic pro- 
duction displaces imports for less regulated products. If regulatory rules 
are efficient, the change in the pattern of trade is desirable. If regulatory 
rules are inefficient, the result is a trade distortion. 
The most efficient regulatory and international economic policies are 
based on distinctions between inefficient regulation and valid differences 
in circumstances as causes of international differences in the costs of regu- 
latory policies. Moreover, the appropriate conceptual model for guiding 
policy is that the social issues that give rise to regulation may cause effi- 
cient differences among nations in the stringency and implementation cost 
of regulation. The latter cost differences are valid sources of comparative 
advantage among nations, and policy should not try to level the regulatory 
playing field by making private compliance costs equal in all nations. In- 
stead, the right policy is to let trade reallocate activity to low-cost sources 
of supply. A nation that has especially valuable environmental resources, 
or that places an especially high value on avoiding illness and injuries, is 
better off if it adjusts the composition of its economy away from activities 
that lead to pollution or poor health. 
Constructing an efficient trade regime, then, requires taking into ac- 
count the efficiency of regulatory regimes. Consequently, regulation inevi- 
tably is part of the optimal trade regime, and regulatory reform a part of 
negotiating trade arrangements. If nations differ in the efficiency of their 
regulatory regimes, completely free trade will cause distortions of  trade 
and a departure from the allocation of production according to compara- 
tive advantage. Hence, pursuit of free trade requires incorporating evalua- 
tions of each nation’s regulatory policy and the possibility of negotiating 
regulatory reform in parallel with trade negotiations. If a domestic indus- 
try raises the competitiveness issue with respect to the cost of domestic 
regulation, the appropriate response is, first, to ascertain whether the firm 
really is overregulated relative to the social cost of its activities; second, to 
determine whether foreign competitors are underregulated  by  the same 
criteria; and, if the answers to these questions are no and yes, respectively, 
to address the problem by seeking to improve regulatory performance in 
the other nation. 
1.4  Economic Analysis of Regulation 
The first step in designing an efficient combination of regulation and 
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lax regulation and between effective and ineffective instruments for deal- 
ing with the problems that regulation is intended to solve. Economic anal- 
ysis  provides a  means  for  identifying whether  regulation  as  practiced 
comes reasonably close to meeting the standard of economic efficiency. By 
presenting a clear statement of the problem to be solved, the theoretical 
objective of a policy intervention, and the performance characteristics of 
the available policy instruments, economic efficiency analysis provides a 
coherent analytical method for assessing the basis for differences among 
nations in the costs of regulatory compliance. This section outlines the 
state of  knowledge about  the rationales  for regulation  and instrument 
choice, as well  as some observations  about how  these issues relate  to 
trade.5  In cases where regulation is warranted, economic efficiency analysis 
identifies cost-effective methods of regulation and, therefore, is a useful 
tool to assist nations in harmonizing regulations so that they are not trade 
distorting and are compatible with liberalization of trade and foreign in- 
vestment. 
The economic analysis of regulation focuses on market failure. Market 
failure occurs when private transactions do not reflect the social costs and 
benefits of an activity. Markets are an efficient method for organizing pro- 
duction and distribution when the number of buyers and sellers is large, 
when buyers and producers are reasonably informed  about  the conse- 
quences of making and producing a product, and when all of the benefits 
and costs of producing and consuming a product are experienced only by 
producers and consumers. Market failure arises when a market departs 
significantly from any of these characteristics. The three types of market 
failure are imperfect information, externalities, and monopoly. A fourth 
market failure, ruinous competition, has been alleged but has been found 
to be an empty vessel. The latter two failures are the primary basis for 
economic regulation, or the regulation of prices, profits, and entry. The 
first two form the primary basis for social regulation, such as controlling 
pollution, improving the safety and healthfulness of products and work- 
places, and requiring full disclosure of the characteristics of products. 
The regulatory policy debate often focuses more on income inequality 
and other aspects of distributive justice than on market failure and effi- 
ciency. Contrary to the belief of many noneconomists, economic analysis 
is not inherently devoid of concern about distributive justice. In particular, 
if individuals care about distributive justice, then the effects of policy on 
distribution are a form of externality that, in principle, can be taken into 
account  in  policy analysis and instrument  design. Economic efficiency 
analysis of regulatory policy can and has focused on three core distributive 
issues: the  actual distributive  effects of  regulation,  the  role of  income 
effects in determining evaluations of regulatory policies, and the relative 
effectiveness of regulation in dealing with distributive concerns. In eco- 
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nomic regulation, the primary distributive justice issue is access to core 
infrastructural  services, such as water,  electricity, and  telephones,  and 
arises in the context of  “universal service” policies. In social regulation, 
the “Lawrence Summers problem” described above has an analogue in the 
idea of uncompensated reallocation of waste to communities that either 
have a low willingness to pay to avoid the reallocation or that lack political 
influence, causing  their  preferences  to be  ignored  in  decisions about 
waste disposal.6 
1.4.1  Economic Regulation 
Ruinous competition is a condition in which a competitive industry en- 
gages in price wars that bankrupt the participants or that cause wild, un- 
predictable price swings that prevent buyers from being able to rely  on 
price predictability. Much of  the regulation and nationalization enacted 
during the 1930s, such as in trucking, airlines, hydrocarbon fuels, and, in 
some countries, manufacturing industries, was based on the belief that the 
Great Depression was caused by  excessive price cutting in  competitive 
markets. Privatization and economic deregulation of  these industries in 
several countries has generated considerable evidence that competition is 
efficient, regulation or nationalization is unnecessary and inefficient, and 
the ruinous competition argument is simply wrong. 
In the United States, economic regulation was either removed or sub- 
stantially relaxed in industries accounting for approximately 10 percent of 
gross domestic product. Recent assessments of the magnitude of the an- 
nual economic benefits of  these changes (primarily in the form of lower 
prices to consumers) are $5 billion for airlines, $8 billion for trucking, 
and $3 billion for natural gas (Winston 1993). In Australia, deregulation 
reduced prices 20 percent in airlines (OECD 1996~).  Privatization of na- 
tionalized airlines produced welfare gains equal to 1.6 percent of sales for 
British Airways, 22.1 percent of sales for Malaysia Airlines, and 48.5 per- 
cent for Aeromexico.’ 
Regulating industries that could be structurally competitive is certainly 
costly to the domestic economy, but it can distort trade as well. To  the 
extent that these regulations apply to services used by  export industries, 
they raise costs and distort both exports and imports. An especially good 
example is the regulation of international transportation, which has not 
been  relaxed as rapidly as domestic regulation. Inefficient regulation of 
6. Discrimination, whether in employment or product markets, can be conceptualized as 
a form of externality that can be dealt with by regulatory means. Whereas discrimination 
against foreign workers is a major issue in trade policy, its analytics are sufficiently different 
from other forms of market failure and regulatory intervention that it is not analyzed in 
this chapter. 
7. Gala1 et al. (1994). For a thorough summary of the literature evaluating privatization 
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international transportation has three distorting effects. First, it reduces 
trade in transportation services by raising its price and imposing rules that 
guarantee a minimum market share to domestic firms. Second, it reduces 
the extent of  beneficial international specialization in other products as 
excessive transportation prices drive an unnecessary wedge between do- 
mestically produced goods and their foreign competition. Third, transpor- 
tation  regulation distorts input choices among transportation firms in 
ways  that  affect trade, such as by  creating pressures to favor domestic 
equipment manufacturers and by  insisting on inefficient route structures 
based on arbitrary distinctions between foreign and domestic terminals. 
Another rationale for economic regulation of competitive industries is 
based on the assertion that a particular form of firm or choice of technol- 
ogy has a cultural externality. Examples are preserving democracy, a na- 
tion’s cultural identity, small business (retail shops, family farms, etc.), 
social cohesion between  rural  and  urban  communities (through  cross- 
subsidies for infrastructural  services), or excess capacity and control in 
case of natural disaster or war.  Some examples of this line of argument 
are claims that, say, foreign branches of Disneyland and McDonald’s, or 
foreign distribution of movies and recorded music from the United States, 
are a form of American cultural imperialism. 
These rationales are difficult to assess, for they are tautological: they 
define the national interest as the present market structure. In many cases, 
these rationales seem to be a relatively transparent excuse for protection 
and cartelization. The point of  this form of  economic regulation is  not 
just to subsidize some users and providers but to do so by elevating prices 
to others, rather than by  implementing a direct, targeted subsidy with a 
broad tax base, which is almost always a far more effective approach in the 
sense that it can achieve the objective of the policy at minimal social cost. 
As is the case for regulations motivated by the ruinous competition ra- 
tionale, economic regulation of competitive markets for the reason of cul- 
tural externalities is extremely costly. For example, in some countries retail 
trade is regulated by controlling entry, setting a maximum store size, and 
limiting shop hours, either through local zoning or national law. These 
regulations undermine competition by  encouraging cartelization and re- 
duce productivity by  causing shops to be too small and underutilized. In 
the nations with the strictest regulations, Italy and Japan until reforms 
began in the 199Os,  the number of retail outlets was roughly double the 
number that would be expected on the basis of other market character- 
istics.* 
Another example of this form of regulation is to serve the goal of uni- 
8. OECD (1992). Since the time of this study, Japan has begun liberalizing retail trade. 
See also Baily (1993), who finds that labor productivity in retail trade is twice as high in the 
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versa1 service in telecommunications and transportation by creating elabo- 
rate regulations (and in some cases a monopoly) that subsidizes rural areas 
by setting prices equal to average cost over a broad, heterogeneous geo- 
graphic area-sometimes  an entire nation-and  requiring firms to serve 
high-cost areas as a condition of serving low-cost areas. The latter policy 
forces the regulator to define the boundary of a firm on the basis of the 
feasibility of a balanced cross-subsidy system rather than operating effi- 
ciency. Privatization, competition, and deregulation in long-distance tele- 
phony, trucking, and airlines all have been opposed on the grounds that 
the consequence would be denial of service to rural communities as well 
as on the basis of the ruinous competition argument. 
The propensity to regulate retail trade and to create regulated firms of 
inefficient scope in communications and transportation to facilitate rural 
cross-subsidization could be an unfortunate precedent for the rise of elec- 
tronic commerce. 
The argument for protecting small shopkeepers from competition by 
department stores or discount retail outlets can easily be applied to elec- 
tronic commerce, which is a similar innovation for increasing the conve- 
nience and reducing the cost of acquiring consumer goods. Whereas retail 
shop laws have had  international  ramifications, such as indirectly pre- 
venting successful retail chains from entering some countries, the interna- 
tional implications of restricting electronic commerce are surely more im- 
portant. Both large department stores and discount retailers still must be 
physically accessible to their customers, so to the extent that there is an 
international ramification, it pertains to physical investment by a foreign 
retail chain. For electronic commerce, physical propinquity  is  unneces- 
sary; a foreign retailer need not invest-or  even set foot-in  a country 
to be successful in selling goods. Hence, regulations to restrict electronic 
commerce, if pursued, are very likely to be a source of major trade distor- 
tions as well as international conflict. 
Likewise, the universal service argument can and has been extended 
to insist that consumers in remote communities should be provided with 
Internet access, regardless of the cost of doing so. In the United States, 
the Telecommunications Act of  1996 states that any service enjoyed by 
over half of the population, or any other service so designated by a special 
universal service commission, is to be considered a universal service to be 
offered to everyone at a price equal to approximately the nationwide av- 
erage cost. In the United States, the regulator-the  Federal Communica- 
tions Commission (FCC)-has  been given the task of figuring out a way 
to achieve this goal while at the same time promoting competition and, 
eventually, deregulation in all aspects of telecommunications service, in- 
cluding local access. But the U.S. policy is unusual, and perhaps infeasible. 
More commonly, the universal service objective is regarded as requiring 
extensive regulation of both prices and the scope of a firm’s operations. Regulatory Reform and International Trade Policy  29 
Regardless of the validity of cultural externalities as market  failures, 
some of these objectives usually can be attained more effectively by direct 
subsidy or procurement by competitive bidding than by  regulations that 
attempt to achieve them by elevating prices and preventing competition. 
For example, one means to assure transportation or communications ser- 
vices to remote communities is to introduce competitive bidding for pro- 
viding service, where the franchise specifies price and service quality and 
requires that all customers be served who seek service at the price, subject 
to penalties for noncompliance. The subsidy can be provided from general 
revenues (as was  enacted as part  of  airline deregulation  in  the United 
States, although the subsidy soon disappeared because small cities did not 
lose service), or through a tax on sales by all firms in the industry (as is the 
approach of the FCC in providing a fund to subsidize universal telephone 
service). Many public objectives can be accomplished more cheaply, with 
less distortion, by  resorting to the procurement model rather than regu- 
lation. 
If  the procurement model is adopted, the trade distortions caused by 
this form of regulation can be reduced. Foreign suppliers can submit the 
low bid to supply subsidized service, and if they are still denied the con- 
tract, the trade-distorting purpose of the regulation is exposed and can 
become an issue for international dispute resolution and negotiation. 
Monopoly can arise from mergers, unfair trading practices, or regulatory 
entry barriers, in which case the cure may be simply to promote competi- 
tion. Economic regulation can make sense only if the monopoly is natural, 
that is, if the technology underpinning the industry is such that only one 
firm can serve a market at minimum cost. 
The rationale for most economic regulation, especially in utility indus- 
tries such as communications, electricity, and water distribution, is the 
presence of natural monopoly somewhere in the industry. For natural mo- 
nopoly to justify a regulated or nationalized monopoly, regulation or na- 
tionalization must not cause even greater inefficiency than an unfettered 
market. In the 1980s, two types of research findings called into question 
both assumptions. First, studies found little or no evidence of scale econo- 
mies in many segments of supposedly natural monop~lies.~  Second, coun- 
tries that allowed competitive entry and engaged in less restrictive regula- 
tion  had  lower  prices  and  more  productive  industries.  For  example, 
relaxation of regulation in railroads and telecommunications in the United 
States saved consumers over $2 billion annually (Winston 1993). Interna- 
tional comparisons find that productivity in the utility sector is substan- 
tially higher in countries with more liberal policies (Baily 1993). In partic- 
9. See Nelson and Primeaux (1988), which finds that scale economies are small enough 
that they are offset by  the efficiency advantages of competition in about forty U.S.  cities that 
have competing utilities, and Bernstein (1988), which finds no significant scale economies in 
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ular, when combined with policies to facilitate transactions among retail 
electric utilities, free entry and almost complete deregulation in electrical 
generation is feasible and offers considerable cost savings. In the 199Os, 
over half of new  generation facilities in the United  States are expected 
to be constructed, owned, and operated by independent power producers 
(Utility Data Institute 1992). 
Regulated monopoly produces inefficient operations for two fundamen- 
tal reasons. First, historically prices in  regulated monopolies have  not 
been set in a manner that encourages monopolists to be efficient. For pri- 
vate monopolies, prices typically were set equal to some measure of aver- 
age  cost.  Because as monopolies these  firms had  unexploited  market 
power, increases in costs could be passed through to customers. Second, 
regulated monopolies, whether private or public, were regarded as a means 
for serving many political purposes other than providing efficient, fairly 
priced service. Among these purposes was subsidizing favored constituen- 
cies (including the government itself). For nationalized monopolies, an- 
other purpose was generating revenue for the government as public off- 
cials saw  tariffs as taxes, rather than prices, to be allocated as part of 
general government revenue.lo All of these policies served to decouple 
prices from costs and to distort if not destroy the incentives of the firm. 
Because regulation has created inefficient operation, the case for strin- 
gently regulating even firms with natural monopoly  characteristics  has 
been seriously questioned. For example, if in an unregulated state an in- 
dustry is likely to be a relatively concentrated oligopoly, it is plausible that 
deregulation will  produce lower prices and better quality (by sharpening 
incentives) than  regulation,  even if  the latter  succeeds in  producing a 
seemingly better ratio of price to average cost. 
If economic regulation is retained because an incumbent’s market power 
is likely to be substantial and durable, the agenda for regulatory reform 
contains two items. The first is to adopt regulations that give firms sharper 
incentives for reducing costs. The second is  to identify the specific ele- 
ments of an industry that are most plausibly a durable monopoly, and to 
adopt policies to assure that practices in these monopolized markets do 
not impede competition and reduce efficiency in other markets. 
In the first category of reforms are “price cap” regulation and “earnings 
sharing” regulation, both of which allow regulated firms to keep some of 
the profits from improved efficiency.“ The alternatives to incentive regula- 
tion are either cost-based price regulation or prices that are set by elected 
political officials, such as by inclusion in a statute, with no necessary con- 
nection to costs or market conditions. The difficulty with the first approach 
10. For  a discussion of the operations of  nationalized  telephone companies, see No11 
11. For an excellent review of incentive regulation, see Baron (1989). 
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is that it rewards inefficiency by increasing allowed prices in proportion to 
costs. The problem with the second is that extreme politicization of prices 
almost always leads to massive financial losses, which are then matched 
by subsidies. Price-cap and earnings-sharing regulation begin with a set of 
prices that allows the firm roughly to break even, but to keep part of the 
profits it derives from cost reductions. Price-cap regulation also gives the 
firm flexibility to change prices as long as, according to an averaging for- 
mula, prices generally do not increase. 
Telecommunications in the United States provides a useful laboratory 
for assessing the effects of incentive regulation. Prior to reform, the U.S. 
telecommunications industry was a monopoly regulated on the basis of 
cost-based pricing and was generally regarded as among the most efficient 
in the world. Nevertheless, in an attempt to improve efficiency, parts of 
the industry were opened to competition. The parts that were regarded as 
insufficiently competitive to allow deregulation were regulated by  many 
different regulatory jurisdictions, both federal and state, and these regula- 
tory authorities have adopted several different forms of price regulation. 
The results of recent research indicate that price-cap regulation has sub- 
stantially increased the rate of productivity advance (Majumdar 1995) and 
has led to lower prices (Crandall and Waverman  1996, 213-15)  and to 
more rapid diffusion of new technology, such as digital switches, advanced 
signaling, and ISDN lines (Greenstein, McMaster, and Spiller 1994). 
The second category of regulatory reform attempts to minimize the ex- 
tent to which regulated monopolies leverage their market power by gain- 
ing an undeserved advantage in markets that are vertically related to the 
monopoly, but that can be competitive. Examples are equipment sales to 
regulated monopolists and products for which the monopoly service is an 
important input. Here policy reforms include proactive intervention by 
competition policy agencies to scrutinize regulations for anticompetitive 
effects; “equal access,” “equal interconnection,” and “open bidding” re- 
quirements so that affiliates of the monopolist are not treated differently 
than their independent competitors; and “separations” requirements for 
unregulated activities of regulated firms.12 
In telecommunications, several countries have successfully segmented 
the industry and introduced competition into several components. In most 
nations,  equipment manufacture has been  separated  from  services, al- 
though a  “national champion” manufacturer usually still commands a 
large share of sales to telephone service companies, abetted by regulatory 
procurement practices. In many countries, radio telephony is somewhat 
competitive and is offered by firms other than monopoly wireline access 
12. For a discussion of which circumstances do and do not plausibly require separations 
in order to introduce competition into a vertically integrated regulated monopoly, see Joskow 
and No11 (1 999). 32  Roger G. Noll 
providers. In some countries, long-distance entry has been permitted and 
is successful. And a very few countries-India,  New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States-have  not only permitted but have tried 
to encourage local wireline access competition, but with limited success. 
In all of these cases, a major issue has been how to prevent a firm that 
enjoys a monopoly in  one segment from leveraging that  monopoly to 
achieve market power in other segments. For example, a competitor in 
long-distance or radio telephony must deal with wireline companies (usu- 
ally monopolies that are either regulated or state owned) in order to com- 
plete its calls. If the wireline monopoly also provides competitive services, 
it can increase its market share in these services by  raising the price or 
lowering the quality of service to its competitors. Inevitably, attempts to 
introduce competition into telephony have led to charges by entrants that 
incumbent vertically integrated firms engage in precisely these practices. 
One approach, vertical divestiture, has been tried in a very few countries, 
most notably the United States and Chile. Most countries have relied in- 
stead on regulation or competition policy to enforce nondiscriminatory 
behavior by the incumbent. 
In several countries, competition also has been introduced in segments 
of the electric utility industry that had been dominated by vertically inte- 
grated monopolies.  l3 One success apparently is in Norway, which created 
a separate state-owned power  pool,  Statnett  Marked,  to manage bulk 
power sales across the territorial boundaries of  regional electric utilities. 
This reform appears to have substantially increased transactions and nar- 
rowed price differences for electricity among regions. Similar experiments 
in California, the eastern United States, England, Sweden, and Australia 
have  introduced  competition  in  generation,  retail  sales,  or both  (see 
Joskow 1998). 
Few countries have tried any degree of vertical divestiture in electricity. 
The exceptions are the creation of two generation companies in England 
and Wales and a policy to favor nonutility companies in building new 
generation capacity in parts of the United States. Complete vertical sepa- 
ration between generation and transmission has not been mandated any- 
where. Instead, governments have attempted to create “independent ser- 
vice organizations” that manage access to the transmission grid, including 
regulating the price of  transmission services as well as determining the 
rules for independent generation sources to use the network to deliver 
power to their customers. This approach essentially separates the owner- 
ship of transmission networks from their management and operation. 
Regulatory reform has faced difficulty in preventing regulated monopo- 
lies from dominating vertically related, potentially competitive markets. 
13. For an excellent summary of  several of these cases, including England, Norway and 
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In the United States, policies to protect against vertical leveraging have 
given rise to persistent conflicts before regulatory agencies and antitrust 
courts for nearly a century (see No11  1995; Joskow and No11  1999). In the 
United Kingdom, which did not adopt separations remedies in telecom- 
munications but did so to a limited degree in electricity, subsequent eval- 
uations concluded that competition has not been extensive and intense 
(see Wolak, chap. 3 in this volume; Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers 1994, 
esp. 355-58). 
In the vast majority of the world, firms in the sectors where the natural 
monopoly argument is most commonly thought to apply have been state- 
owned enterprises. But beginning in the 1980s, several countries privatized 
formerly public enterprises, either as a reform measure that was an end in 
itself or as part of  a plan to introduce competition. These experiences 
provide useful information about the comparative efficiency of  the two 
organizational forms. 
A recent study of generation facilities that account for over 40 percent 
of  the world’s  capacity finds that private utilities produce electricity at 
about 5 percent lower cost than public enterprise utilities (Pollitt 1993). A 
study of privatization in Britain finds efficiency gains of  12 percent for 
British Telecom, 4 percent for National Freight, and 1.6 percent for Brit- 
ish Airways (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). A study of British Gas concludes 
that privatization increased productivity by 2.3 percent; however, inconsis- 
tent results for a productivity effect were found for the regional electric 
utilities (Button and Weyman-Jones 1994a, 1994b). A study of privatiza- 
tion in Chile and Mexico found increases in economy-wide economic ben- 
efits of 50 percent for Telmex, 155 percent for Chile Telecom, and lesser 
but positive benefits for other cases (Gala1 et al. 1994). Even some urban 
water systems in developing countries, such as Abidjan, Buenos Aires, and 
Santiago, have  been  successfully privatized  (Noll,  Shirley, and Cowan 
forthcoming). 
The lessons from reform of economic regulation in many nations are as 
follows. First, substantial gains in efficiency can be captured from improv- 
ing the institutional environment of  regulated infrastructural industries, 
such as by privatizing nationalized companies and adopting incentive reg- 
ulation. Whereas these reforms provide direct domestic benefits in  the 
form of lower prices for consumers, they also remove a trade distortion in 
that they lower the costs of export industries that make intensive use of 
the services of infrastructural monopolies. Second, because the case for 
natural monopoly is problematic, eliminating entry restrictions can intro- 
duce still greater efficiency. 
These conclusions have important international ramifications. Because 
in many infrastructural industries only one firm has been allowed to offer 
service, the most plausible entrant is often the entrenched incumbent in 
another nation. In developing countries, privatization almost always in- 34  Roger G.NoU 
volves at least partial ownership by a foreign company in the same indus- 
try,  and  other  such firms have  almost  always been  the  most  common 
source of competitive entry. In addition, in all of these industries national 
boundaries do not provide a basis for reasonably differentiating markets 
or the scope of a firm. In transportation and telecommunications,  interna- 
tional services are arranged through mutual agreements between nations 
and their designated companies, and in electricity, regional power pools 
in Europe and North America extend across national boundaries. In these 
cases, formal separation of market access based on national boundaries is 
inefficient and precludes competitive entry by the firm that most plausibly 
could extend service in a monopoly service area at lowest cost. Hence, 
mutual relaxation of foreign investment restrictions by  adjacent trading 
partners is a promising mechanism for speeding the evolution to competi- 
tion after formal monopoly franchises have been removed. 
The voluntary WTO agreement regarding access by foreign telecommu- 
nications firms is a good illustration of the connectedness of international 
economic policy and domestic regulation. Signatories to the agreement 
have committed to open at least international calling and in some cases 
elements of domestic service (such as long distance within the country), 
in most cases by  the year 2000. Twenty nations have gone so far as to 
commit to a “single market”  in  telecommunications, allowing firms in 
these countries access to all twenty. 
1.4.2  Social Regulation 
Environmental protection is an example of regulation to deal with ex- 
ternalities. In this case, regulatory reform means, not deregulation, but the 
use of more flexible  methods of  regulation. In almost all countries, the 
standard method of regulating pollution is to set technical standards for 
each source.L4  These standards often are more rigorous for new production 
facilities than for established enterprises and so distort market entry. The 
stringency and cost of standards also vary among industries, further dis- 
torting the pattern of economic activity to favor less rigorously regulated 
sectors. For example, a study of  sulfur oxide emissions in  Los Angeles 
found that the marginal cost of abatement for the most heavily controlled 
sources (electric utilities) was $20,000 per ton, whereas other controlled 
sources faced marginal costs of abatement of around $200 (glass bottle 
manufacturing), and still other sources remained completely uncontrolled 
(dry cleaners; Hahn and No11  1982). 
Technical standards have led to two important sources of trade distor- 
14. For an excellent review of the status of environmental regulation worldwide, see Hart- 
man and Wheeler (1995). For an assessment of the tenacity with which the United Kingdom 
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tions. First, because such standards almost always specify the technique 
that must be used to reduce emissions, the standard itself can be a barrier 
to trade by  ruling out other approaches to compliance that may be as 
effective but  are not consistent  with the standard. Second, by  causing 
differences in compliance costs among sources within the same industry, 
technical standards actually can inefficiently induce imports. For example, 
by  driving a wedge between old and new emission sources, new  source 
performance standards create a discrete jump in the marginal private cost 
of production in an industry when increased production means expansion 
of capacity. If import prices are between the marginal costs of production 
at old and at new facilities, the effect can be to encourage imports to satisfy 
new demand, whereas efficient regulation would allow new firms to enter 
successfully at a price below the import price. 
Because progress in environmental protection has been slow while com- 
pliance costs often have been high, some nations have begun to experi- 
ment with the use of economic incentives rather than technical standards. 
The two primary methods for achieving greater efficiency by introducing 
economic incentives into environmental regulation are emission trading 
and effluent fees. The advantage of both  is  that  they are competitively 
neutral among industries and firms. 
Emission trading in the United States began in the late 1970s with “con- 
trolled  trading  options”  for  six  air  pollutants,  whereby  two  or more 
sources could propose regulations that reallocated pollution among them, 
subject to many procedural requirements and technical constraints. De- 
spite a burdensome process, this program saved at least hundreds of mil- 
lions of dollars, and more likely billions, in compliance costs without re- 
ducing environmental quality (Hahn 1989). Later, in Singapore and the 
United States, emission markets were used to meet international commit- 
ments under the Montreal Protocols to reduce chlorofluorocarbon emis- 
sions. In the United States, emission allowances were allocated according 
to historical production, but emitters were permitted to buy and sell allow- 
ances. In Singapore, emission allocations were sold at auction (O’Connor 
1991). Another example is “offsets” in Germany and the United States, 
whereby new sources of pollution in a heavily polluted area are not per- 
mitted unless emitters reduce emissions from other facilities by more than 
the  amount  of  emissions  created  by  the  new  facility  (Hartman  and 
Wheeler 1995). 
Effluent fees are a tax on the emission of harmful pollutants. The text- 
book model of effluent fees is to set the tax high enough to reflect the 
damage created by pollution so that polluters have a financial incentive to 
abate if  pollution  abatement is less costly than the harm it creates. Al- 
though many countries set effluent fees, these fees are almost never high 
enough to create a significant financial incentive to abate. Sometimes fees 36  Roger G. No11 
are selectively imposed because too few resources are allocated to enforce- 
ment or because politics enters into decisions about how much tax to levy 
on each source of p01lution.I~ 
In a few cases, effluent fees are reasonably effective. One example is 
water pollution control in the Netherlands (Anderson 1994; Hahn 1989). 
Water effluent fees are much higher in  the Netherlands than elsewhere 
and so induce much more abatement at the source, thereby more closely 
approximating the least cost division of responsibility between source con- 
trols and sewage treatment. In Japan, effluent fees for sulfur dioxide emis- 
sions provide a fund for compensating victims of unhealthful air pollution 
(O’Connor 1993). Whether these fees are adequate is debatable, but the 
principle that polluters pay for the damage that they create motivates the 
fees. 
The international consequence of incentive-based environmental regu- 
latory reforms is to reallocate production among nations in a manner that 
reduces total social costs. These reforms reduce compliance costs for in- 
dustries that need to control harmful pollutants. As a result, the relative 
production costs in these industries fall compared with firms in nations 
that use less efficient methods of controlling emissions, and if their prod- 
ucts are traded, these industries gain a larger share of the world market. 
In some cases, the principal effect is that domestic production substitutes 
for exports that appeared attractive only because they were produced in a 
less costly regulatory environment. In other cases, the principal effect is to 
increase exports among industries that experience lower regulatory com- 
pliance costs. In all cam,  all prices and exchange rates adjust so that some 
other industries experience some compensating adjustment in net imports, 
and total trade can either rise or fall. But in all cases, the net effect is an 
increase in  world  productivity  and income as production moves in  re- 
sponse to reductions in social costs. 
Another  international  implication  of  incentive-based  environmental 
regulation is that it beneficially affects location decisions of international 
firms. The relative anonymity of incentive-based environmental reforms 
eliminates the possibility that environmental standards will be applied in 
a discriminatory fashion against foreign investors. Because entry requires 
only that the new facility buy permits or pay emission taxes, rather than 
receive an emission standard and a permit to operate, incentive-based en- 
vironmental regulation eliminates a source of regulatory barriers to entry 
Regulations that deal with information imperfections are called protec- 
tive standards. This category of regulation is broad and heterogeneous. It 
includes product safety, drug efficacy, workplace safety, prudentiality in 
financial services, and protection against fraudulent advertising and prod- 
15. E.g., Poland’s effluent fee system appears not to have worked for these reasons (Wil- 
cynski 1990). Regulatory Reform and International Trade Policy  37 
uct labeling. At the heart of such regulations are two basic concerns. One 
is that one side of a market-consumers  or workers-has  less access to 
information about the quality of the product or workplace than the other 
side and so might be victimized. The other concern is that neither side of 
the market will have an adequate incentive to acquire valuable information 
that would be useful for evaluating products and workplaces, and that, if 
known, might change behavior and hence product and workplace safety. 
As with environmental regulation, the issue in protective regulation is 
not whether such regulation is ever justified but how best to achieve regu- 
latory objectives more efficiently. Protective standards can cause several 
economic problems. First, they can retard beneficial technological change 
by introducing inflexibility in designing products and workplaces. Second, 
they can prevent informed decisions that reflect individual differences in 
attitudes about or susceptibilities to risk. Third, they create a process that 
can be used by producers to create barriers to competition, especially in- 
ternational market access. 
Reform in this area of regulation takes many forms, depending on the 
nature of the problem. One reform is to require full disclosure, backed by 
documentation of claims, so that the uninformed  side of a market has 
more information, and then to let the market determine the appropriate 
degree of risk. Another reform is to adopt international standards pro- 
cesses so that  a consumer  product  or workplace  equipment need only 
prove its acceptability once, rather than separately in each country. Still 
another approach is tc focus on performance standards rather than design 
standards. Performance standards allow greater variety in technical ap- 
proaches to solving the same problem and so encourage cost minimization 
and technological progress. Finally, another approach is to subsidize prod- 
uct testing by  independent authorities (governmental or private) and to 
publicize the results. 
A recent OECD survey indicates that most firms in four industries (toys, 
lawn mowers, microwave ovens, and bicycle helmets) regard the present 
standards system as excessively cumbersome and costly, and about one- 
third  indicated that  some national standards processes prevented them 
from entering markets, even though they had satisfied equivalent stan- 
dards elsewhere (OECD 1996a). The purpose of reform is to avoid these 
effects when they have nothing to do with the protective purposes of regu- 
lation. 
1.5  Priorities for Reform 
The preceding analysis focuses on specific types of regulations and insti- 
tutional  reforms and by  implication  constitutes a long list of areas in 
which literally every nation can find useful examples from other countries 
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on the international implications of three categories of regulatory reform: 
competition policy, procedural requirements such as mandatory benefit- 
cost analysis, and internationalization of reform. All of these policies are 
closely related  to the efficiency concepts discussed in this essay. In the 
absence of any of the market failures discussed here, an unregulated com- 
petitive market is efficient. 
Many hypothesized market failures that underpin regulatory policy are 
illusory or unimportant, in which case regulatory reform means abandon- 
ing regulation and undertaking a vigorous policy to promote competition. 
The presence of a significant market failure provides a rationale for con- 
tinued government intervention  but  does not  require sacrificing either 
competitive markets or economic efficiency. In these cases, regulatory in- 
terventions will be  most effective, first, if  they focus narrowly on curing 
the market failure while minimizing the extent to which they disrupt com- 
petition and, second, if these interventions are designed to achieve their 
policy objectives efficiently. Hence, even when regulation is present, there 
is usually a heightened role for competition policy: to assure that regula- 
tion disrupts competition to the minimum extent necessary to cure the 
market failure. And to help identify the most cost-effective ways to attack 
market failures, regulations should be developed with the aid of a compre- 
hensive economic impact analysis. 
Because regulation has become more important as a source of trade 
barriers, domestic regulatory policy has become a major agenda item in 
negotiations over trade policy. Internationalization of regulatory reform is 
viewed with skepticism and alarm by some advocates of liberalized trade, 
partly because the result of  international regulatory negotiations can be 
the formation of an international cartel beyond the reach of domestic re- 
form. Historical agreements about international telephone and airline ser- 
vices stand as continuing reminders of the pitfalls of international regula- 
tory agreements. 
Notwithstanding  these problems, internationalizing regulatory policy 
also can facilitate the reform process and provide additional insurance 
against backsliding. The arena of international trade negotiations provides 
an opportunity for expanding the benefits of domestic reforms by pairing 
them with foreign reforms that grant domestic firms greater access to ex- 
ternal markets. Once agreement is reached, international trade enforce- 
ment institutions, such as the WTO and  the European Court, provide 
additional protection against subsequent regulatory actions that distort 
trade. 
1.5.1  Competition Policy 
Policies to promote competition are always in some tension with regula- 
tion, and effective regulatory reform usually requires rethinking how this 
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policy promulgates common rules of behavior for firms within a market 
and sometimes encourages monopoly or cartels, whereas competition pol- 
icy seeks to eliminate monopoly and to force firms to operate indepen- 
dently. Fixing a price or a common production technology through a regu- 
latory process is far different conceptually from insisting that each firm 
make price and production decisions separately and letting the competi- 
tive process determine the ultimate performance of the industry. 
The anticompetitive danger of  regulatory policy arises from the fact 
that it asks a regulatory authority to make decisions normally made by 
firms engaged in competition. Consequently, the power to regulate can be 
abused by a group of participants in a market if they can make use of the 
regulatory process to reduce competition among themselves, at the ex- 
pense of other groups in the market. For example, a regulatory standard 
may  reduce pollution, improve product quality, or make the workplace 
safer, but it may also do none of these things but instead simply require 
that consumers buy one type of product rather than another, benefiting 
the producer of that product at the expense of competitors and consumers. 
Regulation often has served anticompetitive purposes by favoring do- 
mestic products over imported ones, thereby creating an indirect trade 
barrier. As discussed above, one example from the United States is policy 
regarding reformulated gasoline, whereby the details of the regulation re- 
quired Venezuelan refiners to make greater improvements in their product 
than were required of U.S. producers of equivalent gasoline (Vogel 1997). 
Another example is the requirement in many countries that suppliers of 
infrastructural services-telephones,  electric power, transportation, and 
so forth-be  domestically owned. 
Certainly the presence of  these examples implies that parallel distor- 
tions in the politics of trade policy are plausible. Regulators seek to give 
domestic producers the advantage partly because foreign producers are 
less likely to be effective participants in the domestic political process, and 
so are less likely to be important sources of political support or opposition 
to a government. Indeed, not only are the employees and owners of an 
excluded foreign firm denied the vote, in most countries any attempt by 
foreigners to influence domestic politics is regarded as a criminal offense. 
A second cause of regulatory favoritism toward domestic firms is that 
most debate about regulatory policies is narrowly focused on a particular 
industry, problem, or even detailed regulation. Even if a statute or an in- 
ternational treaty expresses the objective of avoiding anticompetitive regu- 
lations, anticompetitive outcomes are difficult to avoid if regulation inevi- 
tably  arises from product-specific or industry-specific debates. Specific 
regulations require detailed analyses of the nature of the problem giving 
rise to regulation and its possible solutions. The process of undertaking 
such an analysis favors domestic industries: politically because they can 
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have standing before the regulators  and possess information  needed to 
assess the benefits and costs of regulation. An excluded foreign firm is 
unlikely to have the right to participate in these processes, and the domes- 
tic  interest  that  would  benefit  from  competition-buyers  of  regulated 
products-is  unlikely to find it worthwhile to pay the cost to participate 
in the process as an advocate of foreign competitors. This problem is by 
no means limited to potential foreign competitors. In many cases, no firm 
that is not already a supplier in the industry has rights of participation in 
the  regulatory  process.  Such was  the case  in  airline regulation  in  the 
United States before deregulation (see Breyer 1982, esp. chap. 16) and is 
the case in telecommunications regulation in Japan (see No11 and Rosen- 
bluth 1995). 
The anticompetitive use of regulation, whether against domestic or for- 
eign competitors, is common enough that it has been given a name: “regu- 
latory capture.” This term has an unfortunate connotation of corruption, 
whereby regulators consciously act on behalf of one economic interest at 
the expense of others and to the detriment of the economy. Whereas in 
some cases regulation has served as little more than a means for creating 
a monopoly  or a cartel where otherwise competition would  reign free, 
more subtle forms of capture probably are more important. Regulators 
must adopt regulations on the basis of the information available and the 
proposals made to them. All too often a particular regulatory issue does 
not capture the attention of anyone other than a few companies affected 
by it. If these companies propose a regulation that will reduce competition 
and increase their profits, the regulator may not recognize the fact or may 
not have enough information to ascertain whether a less anticompetitive 
regulation is feasible. 
Competition policy can play an important role in limiting the extent 
to which regulatory policy has unnecessary anticompetitive effects. For 
example, an agency responsible for competition policy can systematically 
review important pending regulatory proceedings and provide its views 
about the effects of alternative regulations on competition. A competition 
policy agency also can bring actions against companies that use the regu- 
latory process for anticompetitive purposes, as in the watershed antitrust 
case  against  the American  Telephone and  Telegraph Company in  the 
United States.I6 
Regarding economic regulation, the introduction of competition into 
formerly  monopolized  infrastructural  industries  has  raised  important 
questions about interconnections between established firms and competi- 
tive entrants. When regulation prevents a monopolist from exercising full 
monopoly power in regulated markets, a strong incentive is created to le- 
16. For details about this case and its interaction with U.S.  regulatory policy, see No11 and 
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verage the regulated monopoly  into competitive areas. The means that 
incumbent monopolists have used to accomplish this objective are to deny 
competitors access to monopoly services that are essential parts of com- 
petitive services and to engage in abusive conduct, such as price discrimi- 
nation, predatory pricing, or degradation of service, to undercut the suc- 
cess of a competitor (OECD 1994a). 
In the environmental, health, and safety area, regulatory standards can 
create entry barriers and can facilitate the formation of cartels. For ex- 
ample, collaborative recycling arrangements sometimes are attractive for 
capturing economies of scale and coordination among manufacturers, but 
they can also give firms opportunities for coordinating pricing and pro- 
duction behavior (OECD 1994b). Likewise, product standards that differ 
very slightly among countries can serve solely to protect a domestic mar- 
ket for a single supplier, as the EEC Commission concluded in reviewing 
a herbicide regulation in Germany (OECD 1995a, 10-11). 
When the anticompetitive policies of regulators exclude domestic sup- 
pliers, competition policy agencies have a domestic political constituency 
that will support their intervention; however, if regulation mainly excludes 
foreign competition, foreign interests face the same political liabilities in 
influencing both competition and regulatory policies. Their lack of effec- 
tive political representation  is as likely to affect one bureaucracy as an- 
other. But dispute resolution institutions created to enforce trade agree- 
ments can serve this  function. These entities  can  be  the international 
counterpart  to  domestic  competition  policy  agencies  if  international 
agreements give them the authority to examine whether regulations anti- 
competitively exclude foreigners. 
1.5.2  Procedural Reform: Mandatory Economic Policy Analysis 
Procedural reform refers to a variety of proposals for improving the 
quality of regulation by improving its structure and procedures. Examples 
of such reforms are changes in rights of standing before regulatory author- 
ities, the burden  of proof, the standard of proof, the nature of judicial 
review, and the place of the regulatory authority in the hierarchy of gov- 
ernment agencies. The structure and process of regulation are important 
determinants of the three major aspects of regulatory  outcomes: strin- 
gency (how tough is the regulatory requirement?); equity (how are the bur- 
dens and benefits of regulation allocated across industries, geography, and 
demographic categories?); and ejicicncy (does the regulation achieve its 
purposes at lowest possible cost?). 
The structure and process of  regulation  are important  because they 
affect the flow of information both in the regulatory process and to citi- 
zens about the basis for a regulatory rule. In essence, structure and process 
determine the relative weights given to different interests and types of in- 
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1987, 1989). An important purpose of structural reform is to improve the 
efficiency of regulation by making the process more open and transparent. 
A prominent example of procedural reform is to require some form of 
economic policy analysis, which refers to a range of analytic methods for 
evaluating policies. The most common form is benefit-cost analysis; re- 
lated  methods  include comparative  risk  analysis and cost-effectiveness 
analysis. The issue at stake is the extent to which economic policy analysis 
should play a role in the process of developing new regulations and regula- 
tory policies. 
The purpose of economic policy analysis of regulatory proposals is to 
provide a systematic framework for organizing relevant information for 
informing decisions, and to provide insight about the extent to which reg- 
ulation is consistent and coherent across different areas of regulatory pol- 
icy. A major criticism of regulation is that lessons from one domain of 
regulation are slow to spill over into others, and that different regulations, 
adopted at different times by  different regulators, that deal with similar 
issues take vastly different approaches. 
One study of 185 different regulatory proposals in the United States for 
improving health discovered no correlation between the cost-effectiveness 
of a proposal for saving lives and whether it was implemented (Tengs and 
Graham 1996). For example, this study points out that the existing stan- 
dard for regulating the flammability of children’s clothing has a cost of 
$1.5 million per life saved, but another proposal to require smoke alarms 
in homes with children present, which would have cost only $200,000 per 
life saved, was rejected. Thc authors found that the best estimate of total 
life-years saved from all of the adopted regulations was 592,000 per year 
at a cost of approximately $21.4 billion. Had this sum been spent in the 
most effective way, the total annual number of life-years saved would have 
been 1,230,000,  or more than double the number currently being saved. 
Another  recent  study compiled the results of ninety-one benefit-cost 
analyses undertaken  for major  regulations  adopted  or pending  in  the 
United States from 1990 to 1995 (Hahn 1996). The good news, according 
to the study, is that all fifty-four final regulations adopted, taken together, 
generated net benefits of nearly $300 billion in discounted present value.” 
The bad news is that thirty-one of these regulations have negative net ben- 
efits, and three had negative net benefits exceeding $10 billion. 
The primary controversial issues concerning economic policy analysis 
are how it should be undertaken and what status it should have in  the 
regulatory process. Proposals about the formal role of economic analysis 
range  from  establishing  an  agency for  undertaking  such  analyses, to 
17. The good news is not without qualification, for this finding rests on the accuracy of 
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allowing the agency to select its targets and to have standing in regulatory 
proceedings, to requiring that all regulations pass a benefit-cost test before 
they are adopted. OECD member countries illustrate almost the full range 
of possibilities (OECD 1995b). 
A group of U.S.  economists has proposed a new role for benefit-cost an- 
alysis in environmental, health, and safety regulation (Arrow et al. 1996a, 
1996b). They set out the purposes of analysis: to encourage greater consis- 
tency and transparency in regulatory policy, as well  as to improve the 
efficiency of regulation. To  this end, they propose that all major regula- 
tions be subject to mandatory benefit-cost analysis before a final regula- 
tion is adopted. In addition, they propose that all benefit-cost analyses 
have three features: first, the analysis should be based on a common set 
of assumptions about common parameters, such as the social discount 
rate and the value of reductions in morbidity and mortality; second, the 
analysis should examine the sensitivity of the magnitude of net benefits to 
the values of key parameters of the analysis; and third, the analysis should 
be subject to a system of peer review. Finally, they propose that agencies 
be required to justify rejecting a regulation expected to yield positive net 
benefits and adopting a regulation that has negative net expected benefits 
or that achieves positive net benefits only when it uses nonstandard as- 
sumptions about key parameters. A similar proposal was made by a panel 
of expert advisers to the Commission of the European Communities. 
Making economic policy analysis mandatory is controversial, and in- 
deed the commission rejected the proposal of its expert panel, making 
reference to standard arguments against mandatory policy analysis: 
The Commission supports the thrust of this proposal. But the practica- 
bility of cost-benefit analysis has to be examined on a case by case basis. 
In the particular field of the environment, there is a question of what 
constitutes a “reasonable” balance between costs and benefits. The ben- 
efits for environment and society are mostly qualitative and often im- 
possible to express in monetary values unlike, for example, the costs to 
business. The Treaty (130r(3)) also requires that the costs and benefits 
of non-action also be examined. (Commission of the European Commu- 
nities 1995, 26-27) 
The commission’s decision to reject the proposal that all regulations must 
generate positive net benefits is reasonable, but the reasons given contain 
important misperceptions, and the decision not to require systematic eco- 
nomic policy analysis is not supported by these reasons. 
To  begin, a competent benefit-cost analysis does not ignore the costs 
and benefits of inaction. Benefits and costs are measured as incremental 
changes from the status quo, so that the net benefits of a policy change 
are identically equal to the net  cost  of  inaction. Indeed, a competent 
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and costs of all relevant alternatives to both the status quo and the pro- 
posed regulation. 
Another important misperception is the statement by  the commission 
that costs are easier to quantify than benefits, biasing benefit-cost analysis 
in  favor of  inaction. This statement reflects a fundamental error in  the 
commission’s reasoning: “Cost” in benefit-cost analysis does not refer to 
the financial cost to producers in complying with the regulation but in- 
stead to the social cost of adopting the regulation. These concepts are not 
the same for two basic reasons: uncertainties and unquantifiable effects 
affect the cost side as well as other forms of information that are essential 
to formulating regulations, and the presence of imprecision is a matter to 
be identified and explicitly taken into account, not to be ignored by sweep- 
ing analysis under the rug. 
On the cost side, allocating resources to regulatory compliance, instead 
of  other activities, also poses risks to life and the environment that are 
difficult to quantify. The issue of evaluating life actually demonstrates the 
value of careful economic analysis. Disposable family income is strongly 
correlated with rates of morbidity and mortality. One study estimates that 
if  a regulatory action imposes a cost of  $50 million, the regulation will 
cause one additional death due to the reduction in purchasing power that 
must occur to pay for the cost of the regulation (Viscusi 1996). And if  a 
regulation causes a reallocation of  economic activity to other products, 
this reallocation inevitably leads to increases in exposure to other hazards 
and environmental damage, in part offsetting the benefits of the regula- 
tion. Whereas the appropriate number for the value of a life saved is surely 
subject to considerable uncertainty, the preceding observations provide an 
important insight: most likely, no regulation that imposes a cost exceeding 
$50 million per life saved should be adopted, not because $50 million is a 
good estimate of the value of a life, but because a regulation that costs 
that much will cause at least as much indirect damage as it is intended 
to cure. 
Mandatory economic analysis of regulatory policies is related to inter- 
national trade because it facilitates identifying whether regulations pro- 
mote efficiency or distort trade. An agreement among nations to use com- 
mon  analytical  methods  for  evaluating  regulatory  proposals  drives 
regulation in each nation toward efficient policies and thereby reduces the 
distortions arising from regulations of different efficiency among nations. 
In this sense, adopting a common efficiency metric for domestic regulatory 
actions has the same role in reducing trade distortions as does a common 
agreement to reduce tariffs in that both reduce the wedge between actual 
prices and social costs of production. Moreover, agreement about meth- 
ods for evaluating regulations is a necessary component of a mechanism 
for resolving trade disputes over the ultimate purposes and effects of reg- 
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regulations that have  an anticompetitive purpose and distort trade from 
regulations that are efficient even though they have differential impacts on 
some imports. 
1.6  International Regulatory Reform and Trade 
Until recently, the regulatory reform debate has been regarded primarily 
as an issue of domestic economic policy. As implied by  the discussion of 
electronic commerce and of the trade distortions created by differences in 
regulatory efficiency among nations, a narrow, nationalistic view of regula- 
tory reform is not valid. As a result, recent trade negotiations and agree- 
ments inevitably have included provisions relating to regulatory issues. For 
example, the Uruguay Round led to an agreement that internal political 
constraints could not override principles of  open access and created a 
WTO Committee on the Environment.'s 
Regulatory distortions take two conceptually distinct forms: domestic 
and international. This conceptual division implies a scheme for setting 
priorities: focus international agreements on regulatory issues that cause 
significant international distortions. The inefficiencies of regulation that 
are purely domestic are not necessarily an international priority for re- 
form. Whereas these effects are unfortunate, the costs mostly are confined 
to the country that causes them. If  inefficient regulation has significant 
international repercussions, coordination and cooperation among nations 
in regulatory reform have the same status as multinational arrangements 
for reducing direct trade barriers. Mutuality in reform creates economic 
benefits that are broadly shared among domestic consumers and trading 
partners. 
As a practical matter, very little distorting regulation has purely domes- 
tic effects. International boundaries rarely define natural market barriers 
that cannot be crossed, and in most cases, the most efficient organization 
of an industry is international. For example, infrastructural industries (en- 
ergy utilities, communications, transportation, and finance) all operate 
more efficiently if  their networks are organized according to the pattern 
of transactions, and in a relatively open world economy, these patterns do 
not respect national borders. But even if  markets are national or indeed 
local, entry by foreign firms can be an important source of price competi- 
tion and productivity improvements. Many segments of  retail trade are 
more efficient if  international chains of outlets and, of course, electronic 
commerce are permitted.  Hence, both market  access for  foreign-made 
goods and openness to foreign investment promote economic growth, and 
regulations that prevent either create distortions of international signifi- 
18. For a discussion of the incorporation of  environmental issues into trade agreements 
and enforcement organizations, see Roessler (19964. 46  Roger G. Noll 
cance. International agreements about regulation are the natural vehicle 
to eliminate these distortions. 
An additional advantage of internationalizing regulatory reform is that 
it can be used to elevate the domestic political debate about regulation 
from narrow issues to matters of national economic performance and in- 
ternational cooperation. From a political perspective, making regulatory 
reform an international issue is highly desirable. A common political bar- 
rier to domestic regulatory reform is that if reform is perceived as a domes- 
tic issue and is debated one issue at a time, well-organized special interests 
are more likely to have the political power to block it. For most specific 
regulatory issues, the beneficiaries of reform are numerous, but their per 
capita benefits are often too low or too indirect to generate significant 
political pressure for reform. If the reform debate is elevated to a matter 
of international policy that encompasses numerous reform issues, broader 
attention and participation from all interests is more likely, thereby reduc- 
ing the ability of a single interest to block reform. 
A useful analogy is to the process of setting tariffs (see Goldstein 1996). 
When each nation independently sets each tariff separately, the resulting 
tariffs are likely to be higher than those that would have been negotiated 
bilaterally as part of a comprehensive trade agreement. The reason is that 
debating tariffs one product at a time maximizes the undue influence of 
organized interests with a direct stake in the policy. If a tariff on a specific 
product is under review, the domestic industry that produces the product 
is likely to be intensely interested and to exercise whatever political influ- 
ence it has to obtain a policy decision favorable to itself; however, because 
the final price of the product is less important to individual buyers than 
to individual producers, the former are less likely to participate in  the 
debate. Consequently, each important trade-sensitive industry may receive 
and preserve a tariff or a favorable regulation when policy is debated in a 
purely domestic context one industry at a time, but it may receive neither 
protective  tariffs  nor protective  regulations  when  policy  is  developed 
multinationally and covers many industries. 
When each regulation is considered separately as a matter of domestic 
policy within a specialized agency, the government is likely to be under 
less pressure to adopt an efficient policy. If a regulation imposes unneces- 
sary costs uniformly on firms in a domestic industry, sales of the industry’s 
product may be suppressed somewhat by higher prices, but the individual 
firms are unlikely to suffer much because none is at a disadvantage relative 
to a competitor. If international trade threatens the industry, however, the 
industry will energetically seek relief. The politically expedient move may 
be to inhibit trade competition, either by  using regulation as an indirect 
trade barrier or by banning trade while making a rhetorical attack on the 
lax standards of a trading partner. This approach placates the regulated 
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The primary organized harmed interest, foreign producers, is more easily 
ignored because they do not participate in domestic politics. 
Just as simultaneous negotiation over tariffs on all products conduces 
to agreements that provide freer trade, so too does simultaneous negotia- 
tion of numerous areas of regulation facilitate the elimination of regula- 
tory indirect trade barriers. As with tariffs, the inclusion of multiple regu- 
latory policies within the same negotiation creates more opportunities for 
mutually beneficial bargains to reduce distortions simultaneously on all 
fronts. Recent experience with multilateral negotiations bears out this be- 
lief.19 On both the trade and regulatory fronts, with the exceptions of the 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the voluntary agreement to lib- 
eralize telecommunications access, no single-issue negotiation under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and few outside of it 
have produced a significant commitment to openness, and many have in- 
cluded new, onerous regulatory requirements. Examples of failures are the 
International Dairy Agreement, which establishes minimum world prices 
for dairy products; the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, which countenanced 
import  quotas; and the Montreal Protocols,  which  set world limits on 
emissions of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) but prohibited 
reallocation among nations of either production or consumption of CFC- 
related products through trade or international investment. 
The lesson from these examples is that incorporation of regulation into 
trade agreements should follow the same principles that have been gener- 
ally followed with respect to tariffs and quotas. Specifically, if regulatory 
policy is part of an international agreement, it must reduce, not increase, 
distortions in the international economy and extend, not contract, the ex- 
tent of liberalization. Introducing regulation into single-product negotia- 
tions tends to increase trade distortions (as regulation is used to inhibit 
trade). In particular, negotiations about a single product or area of regula- 
tion risk creating an alliance between protectionists and the most ardent 
advocates of a particular regulatory policy who seek regulations that go 
far beyond those that maximize net social benefits. 
The same argument applies to the enforcement of agreements not to 
adopt anticompetitive regulations. If enforcement powers reside solely in 
domestic agencies, a case in which a regulation places foreign producers 
at a disadvantage rests on unbalanced underlying politics. Domestic pro- 
ducers are likely to be more effectively represented than foreigners in the 
agency and in the background political system within which the agency 
must operate. Consequently, actions to eliminate the anticompetitive in- 
ternational effects of regulation are likely to face more political resistance 
than support. 
International institutions for resolving regulatory trade disputes operate 
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in a more balanced  political  environment.  These institutions can be a 
means through which nations mutually can commit to maintain procom- 
petitive regulatory reforms. The GATT and WTO disputes about automo- 
bile fuel efficiency and reformulated gasoline illustrate how domestic regu- 
latory agencies but not international institutions are willing to sacrifice 
competition as well as some of the effectiveness of regulatory policies in 
order to favor domestic producers. 
For these reasons, internationalization of regulatory reform can succeed 
by enfranchising foreign producers in domestic regulatory policy across a 
spectrum of industries. In the context of a dispute about the trade effects 
of a particular regulation, intervention by  an international organization 
often is met with cries of outrage-an  intervention by foreigners into do- 
mestic policy. All international agreements entail some loss of the ability 
to act independently in order to achieve something else of value, which in 
this case is a worldwide regulatory system that is more efficient and freer 
of trade distortions. Such an institution generates net economic benefits 
to each country, even if some cases create some domestic losers. The cre- 
ation of institutions for enforcing agreements to eliminate indirect trade 
barriers is a means to balance the political influence of these domestic 
losers. 
The growing movement for regulatory reform throughout the world has 
increased the potential significance of internationalizing the reform pro- 
cess. If some nations operate a relatively efficient regulatory system while 
others do not, international cost differences arising from regulation are 
likely to surface as political issues in high-cost countries. Perhaps the re- 
sult will be reform, but another plausible scenario is protection  against 
“unfair” competition. Initiating multisectoral  international negotiations 
over phased reform offers an opportunity to seize the initiative, casting 
the agenda in terms of improved efficiency rather than retaliation against 
unfair trade. Domestic reform that enfranchises competition policy agen- 
cies facilitates free trade by promoting reforms of regulatory policies that 
erect entry barriers. Reforms that impose mandatory benefit-cost analysis 
facilitate free trade by  creating a stronger information base from which 
to challenge regulatory trade barriers in international dispute resolution 
institutions.  Finally, designing these same dispute resolution  entities to 
incorporate  the principles  of  competition  policy  and economic policy 
analysis has two potential benefits: regulations are identified that have no 
plausible rationale other than to place foreign competition at a disadvan- 
tage, and beyond this, the degree to which differences in regulatory policy 
create differential regulatory efficiency is reduced. Both effects of the inter- 
nationalization of regulatory reform serve the objectives of international 
openness and help to eliminate an important source of distortions in the 
international economy. Regulatory Reform and International Trade Policy  49 
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Comment  Anne 0. Krueger 
This is a very rich paper, from which I learned a lot. The impression that 
stands out, among many others, is the great extent to which  regulation 
and trade policy issues overlap and yet have been analyzed by two separate 
communities, with much less cross-fertilization than would have been de- 
sirable. Coming from the perspective of trade policy, I hope that Roger 
Noll’s paper will make a major breach in the wall separating the two areas, 
and I believe that trade policy analysts will greatly benefit from this, and 
hopefully further, interaction. 
No11  starts  by  noting  the  distinction  between  efficient regulation- 
which occurs when market failures are compensated for in a least cost way 
by  public policy that results in an increase in social welfare-and  actual 
regulation, which may have much higher cost because of nonoptimal regu- 
latory behavior or because costs exceed the social benefits of regulation. 
Distinguishing between instances of market failures that policy can bene- 
ficially correct and instances where regulation is either inefficient or favors 
the regulated  is  a primary concern of  policy  analysis in  the regulatory 
arena. In the past two decades, much regulation has been overhauled as in- 
efficiencies have come to be recognized. 
For international trade policy, the appropriate analogue would appear 
to be distinguishing between instances in which there are legitimate bases 
for protection (national defense, perhaps) and cases in  which  pleas for 
protection are based on legitimate issues (or on issues that garner political 
support) but come from those producers who expect to benefit privately. 
No producer has ever based his case for protection solely on the proposi- 
tion that he alone will be better off with protection: the argument is always 
couched in terms of the social benefits of the industry, the unfair competi- 
tion from abroad, the threat to jobs, or other aspects of the social good. 
A major difficulty with calls for linkages between trade and the environ- 
ment has been that many of  those most enthusiastically endorsing the 
linkage are those who would most benefit from protection. 
But as No11  points out, as artificial trade barriers-primarily  tariffs- 
have fallen, the possibility of international distortions arising out of in- 
efficient regulation, or the interaction of inefficient regulation and protec- 
tion, has made it all the more urgent to achieve efficient regulation, and 
in his view to achieve international agreements on regulatory regimes as 
well.  That firms in one country are more sensitive to (artificial or eco- 
nomic) small cost differences because of lowered trade barriers and trans- 
port costs goes without saying. 
Anne 0. Krueger is the Herald L. and Caroline L. Ritch Professor of Economics, senior 
fellow of the Hoover Institution, and director of the Center for Research on Economic De- 
velopment and Policy Reform at Stanford University, and a research associate of the Na- 
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The question is  the extent to which international  agreements can be 
reached that genuinely reduce the artificial cost differences resulting from 
differences in national regulatory regimes (so, e.g., that there is a race to 
the bottom), as contrasted with the extent to which some countries will 
be enabled to impose their preferences on other countries in response to 
protectionist  pressures from  domestic  producers.  Especially  for  poor 
countries, the risk that the OECD countries may try to impose their envi- 
ronmental preferences (even when there are no international spillovers) on 
poorer countries is real. While No11  recognizes that such an outcome is 
possible, he is more sanguine than I am that an efficient outcome can be 
achieved. 
It is certainly true that pressures for an international “competition” pol- 
icy, or common rules of the game for producers in different countries, are 
growing. And the absence of common rules is used as an excuse for seeking 
protection. However, while market failure can justify regulation, govern- 
ment failure also has risks. As anyone dealing with trade policy issues is 
well aware, lobbyists seem to have even more disproportionate influence 
on trade policy than they do on matters of domestic interest. 
The real challenge is to find ways to achieve international agreement on 
a competition (or regulatory) policy that is socially efficient and does not 
provide cover for protectionist measures. Anyone recognizing how difficult 
it has been to reach agreement even  on such matters as customs proce- 
dures, scientific criteria for phytosanitary standards, and mutual recogni- 
tion of standards among developed countries will naturally be less than 
sanguine about the prospects, at least in the next several years, for achiev- 
ing an efficient international competition policy. Government failure has 
been more prominent than market failure in international trade. 
Nonetheless, I think I agree with the conclusion: as other trade barriers 
and transactions costs fall, it will be increasingly important to achieve a 
satisfactory competition policy as protectionist pressures mount. Search- 
ing for ways to ensure that such an agreement is socially efficient is surely 
an endeavor where the benefit-cost ratio can be very high. 
Comment  Sadao Nagaoka 
This is a highly informative paper and poses a number of challenging ques- 
tions for future regulatory reform. Although I support many of its conclu- 
sions, I have two reservations with regard to its international aspects. 
Sadao Nagaoka is professor of management and economics at the Institute of Innovation 
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International Impact of Domestic Regulation 
Inefficient domestic regulation distorts resource allocation but does not 
necessarily harm trading partners. It does so when such regulation reduces 
trading or investment opportunities or when it has a negative cross-border 
spillover, such as acid rain. Otherwise, inefficient regulation harms only 
the home country. Noll, however, seems to assume that inefficient regula- 
tion pervasively reduces the welfare of trading partners. For example, he 
argues that a country with strict environmental regulation will lose “effi- 
cient” industry if it liberalizes trade with a country with lax environmental 
regulation. But from the national welfare point of view, what determines 
the efficient use of resources is the difference between domestic production 
cost and international market price. Thus free trade still benefits the coun- 
try with high environmental standards. 
Necessity of Internationalizing  Regulatory Reform 
The necessity of internationalizing regulatory reform seems to be clear 
when regulation limits market entry, and thus trade and investment oppor- 
tunities, or when it has direct cross-border spillovers. In this case each 
country has a clear stake in the progress of the regulatory reform of trad- 
ing partners. On the other hand, the necessity of internationalizing envi- 
ronmental policy and other regulations generally, as No11 seems to suggest, 
is not clear at all, since one country’s choice of such policies does not 
materially harm the welfare of other countries,  and efficient regulation 
differs between nations, depending on national conditions. If the interna- 
tionalization  of regulation is pursued in order to level  the playing field, 
there is a clear danger that it will lead to inefficient regulation. 